Lessons Learned by the Deployable Joint Force Headquarters

By Major General Stuart L Smith, DSC, AM

The 1st Division is a unit that was rebadged as the Deployable Joint Force Headquarters in 1998. This Headquarters comprises 151 full time and 71 part time personnel, including 19 Navy and eight Airforce staff. A headquarters tasked by the Chief of Defence Force to prepare and command assigned forces in order to meet Chief of Army and Chief of Defence Force specified and contingency requirements.

Since 1999 this headquarters has led several significant regional and international operations. Without doubt, our landmark operation, from a headquarters and Australian Defence Force (ADF) perspective was Operation Warden (OW) in East Timor in 1999. Our command and control experience has since extended to humanitarian disaster relief operations, such as Sumatra Assist (SA) in Indonesia in 2005 and Philippines Assist (PA) in 2013, as well as capacity building on Operation Okra (OO) in Iraq in 2015. But how much have we adapted as a headquarters since OW?

Today I would like to reflect on the lessons learned by the Deployable Joint Force Headquarters 1999-2015. I will do so by using the lessons learned during operation warden as a lens for examining our headquarters performance on subsequent operations. My overall assessment will offer that we have matured markedly since 1999, to the extent that we have become the preferred mission command node for leading short notice joint interagency operations for our Defence Force. On 15 September the United Nations (UN) authorized the establishment of a multinational peace enforcement mission.

Blamey Oration c’td on P. 2
It was named the International Force East Timor (INTERFET) and was led by Australia. Its role was to restore peace and security, support other UN forces, and facilitate humanitarian assistance, where possible. The nucleus of the Headquarters INTERFET was Australia’s own Deployable Joint Force Headquarters, led by then Major General Peter Cosgrove. This headquarters commanded a coalition of 22 countries and a force of 11,000 troops.

In his book ‘The Australian Army from Whitlam to Howard’, author John Blaxland identified three key lessons from INTERFET. First that Operation Warden demonstrated the merits of a joint approach to operations, particularly air and maritime assets in support of land forces. According to Blaxland: “To be sure, the major impediment to effective joint operations was the fact that Australian continents had, for the preceding century, operated primarily as separate contingents alongside allies. The services tended to cling to their preferred mode of operating separately and resisting joint arrangements for their command, employment and provisioning. But this approach was unsustainable in circumstances where Australia was in charge and when Australian components had to support each other, without relying heavily on allies.”

Second the value of sustained international engagement to prepare for the establishment of multinational forces and the conduct of regional crisis response operations. Blaxland argued that a ‘Coalition of the Willing” was facilitated by the fact that Australia had engaged with many nations on key leadership visits, bilateral and multilateral command post and field training exercises prior to 1999. He provides the example that: “In early September 1999, when Australia was looking around for a regional partner to contribute forces and leadership to the International Stabilisation Force in East Timor, assistance came from an unexpected corner. Thailand was the first country in ASEAN to agree to contribute forces and also provided the Deputy Force Commander. The agreement came after decades of engagement with the Royal Thai armed forces and followed shortly after the bilateral exercise Chapel Gold between elements of the 2nd Battalion Royal Australian Regiment (2 RAR) and the Royal Thai Army’s Ready Deployment Force.”

Third was the importance of rehearsals. Blaxland noted that the Deployable Joint Force Headquarters had conducted an Australia/Britain/Canada/America or ABCA Command Post exercise six weeks prior to deploying on Operation Warden, and that this had prepared all staff very well for their command, control, communications and coordination responsibilities on INTERFET. But how were these lessons for our headquarters regarding the importance of a joint approach, of international engagement, and rehearsals, reflected on subsequent operations? The answer came all too soon when on Boxing Day 2004 an earthquake and tsunami struck off the west coast of Sumatra, causing widespread devastation in coastal communities across India, Thailand and Indonesia. On 27 December 2004, our unit was ordered to form Headquarters Joint Task Force 629 and deploy to Sumatra to command and control defence support to the Australian government’s national humanitarian relief effort to Indonesia.

The headquarters was assigned operational control of army aviation, engineer, health and logistic elements, and was supported by RAAF C130, Kingair as well as HMAS Kanimbla. The Joint Task Force focus area of operations was Banda Aceh and the main headquarters was established in Medan, during a three month deployment it coordinated: the distribution of 1,200 tonnes of humanitarian aid by air, the evacuation of 2,530 disaster affected people, the treatment of 3,700 casualties, the production of 4.7 million litres of clean water and the clearing of 9,000 cubic metres of debris.

From the outset, the headquarters adopted a joint approach. Maritime staff from the Amphibious Task Group, air staff from the Air Lift Group and logistic staff from the Force Support Battalion were integrated into Headquarters Joint Task Force 629. It meant that the deliveries of humanitarian supplies by Australian Air Force and Naval assets
were centrally coordinated, and that engineer reconstruction tasks were centrally prioritised, but a new lesson emerged.

That was the importance of a civil military or interagency approach. This was most apparent during the response phase of the operation when over 160 different government and non-government aid agencies converged on the local airfield at Banda Aceh to distribute food, water and medical assistance to the most gravely affected disaster survivors.

To mitigate the risk that vital humanitarian assistance would fail to meet the relief priorities set by the Indonesian government, our headquarters created a civil military cooperation framework with the Indonesian authorities. It comprised a coordination cell at the district capital Medan and an operations centre, or CMOC, at Banda Aceh airfield. Led by Lieutenant Colonel David McGuire, the coordination cell ensured that Australian military capabilities complimented rather than contradicted other government and non-government capabilities. One example was the provision of emergency food, water and shelter to villagers isolated from Banda Aceh.

AUSAID had the capacity to provide portable food and shelter packages, but lacked the capability to deliver these packages. Accordingly, the Civil Military Co-ordination Cell scheduled RAAF C130 aircraft to transport these packages from Medan to Banda Aceh, where they were cross loaded to army helicopters and delivered to remote locations identified by Indonesian Armed Forces liaison officers at our CMOC. Having seen the value of civil military cooperation in this context, on return to Australia we established a permanent Civil Military Co-operation Branch within DJFHQ. We tasked this branch to refine CIMIC doctrine and training, and develop habitual relationships with those government and non-government agencies we were likely to operate with during future crisis response operations. Operation Sumatra Assist demonstrated a clear learning from Operation Warden and a leap forward in our joint interagency approach as a headquarters.

The next major activity in which our headquarters was tested was operation Philippines Assist in 2013. And the imagery from that operation reflected scenes similar to operation Sumatra Assist. On 8 November 2013, typhoon Haiyan, known locally as Yolanda, made landfall in the eastern Philippines region. The United Nations reported that Haiyan had affected around 14 million people and displaced an estimated four million. On 12 November, we were directed to form Headquarters Joint Task Force 630 to command and control defence support to the Australian government's national humanitarian relief effort to the Philippines. The headquarters was assigned operational control of army engineer, health and logistic elements, and was supported by RAAF air transport assets, as well as HMAS Toobruk. Focussing its operations in the central region of ORMOC, during a one month deployment the headquarters coordinated: the repair of 16 schools and 180 classrooms, the removal of 1302 cubic metres of debris, the evacuation of 3300 internally displaced persons and the distribution of two tonnes of humanitarian aid.

The key observation for our headquarters from this operation was the manner in which our program of international engagement had exponentially improved our mission effectiveness. Through our cycle of command post and field training exercises we had developed a generation of staff officers who now enjoyed a habitual working relationship with counterparts officers in our Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Department of Border Protection and Customs, as well as the Philippines Armed Forces, Marine Forces Pacific and Japanese Ground Self Defence Forces. And these were the very same officers our headquarters worked beside as part of the international relief efforts in the Philippines. As the commander of the Joint Task Force, Lieutenant Colonel Rod Lang reflected: “The United States military response to the disaster was led by the commander of the 3rd U.S. Marine Expeditionary Brigade. I had worked with him that year on exercise Talisman Sabre. So, I was able to liaise with him directly and confirm the concept for our Australian military support quickly.” But each of these regional contingency operations took place at the same time as our defence force was committed to an era of specified global operations.

I speak here of our deployments to Iraq on Operation Catalyst and Afghanistan on Operation Slipper. During this period, the DJFHQ found itself responsible for mounting and certifying land forces for these operations. Having
realised the value of rehearsals during Operation Warden, we introduced a program of mission rehearsal activities and exercises as part of the mounting and certification process. The 39th Operational Support Battalion and the Combat Training Centre were placed under command of the DJFHQ to enact this individual and collective training program.

In addition, the headquarters established the Adaptive Warfare Branch to conduct analysis of current operations, and identify lessons for immediate implementation within our force preparation program. One output from the Adaptive Warfare Branch was the drafting and issue of pre-deployment handbooks. Prior to deploying on Operation Warden, some troops received a 40 minute country brief as part of their battle procedure.

Today, pre-deployment handbooks are used in conjunction with mission rehearsal activities. They provide each individual undergoing force preparation with a ready reckoner on the mission, history, geography, culture, and language aspects pertinent to their area of operation. Another output has been, in cooperation with the Combat Training Centre, the design of specific mission training events so that they are as contemporary as the current operational environment as possible. The Adaptive Warfare Branch was further tasked to establish a working relationship with the Defence Science and Technology Organisation to ensure that a scientific method was applied to all aspects of operational analysis. Through the Adaptive Warfare Branch, we have seen a gradual improvement in the standard of force preparation of individuals and force elements. Our most recent headquarters deployment provides a very good example.

On 14 October 2014, we were directed to plan, force prepare, command and control a 400 person Australian and New Zealand Build Partner Capacity Task Group as part of the Australian Defence Force’s contribution to the international effort to combat the Daesh (also known as ISIL) terrorist threat in Iraq. The task group headquarters was assigned operational control of army training, force protection, communications and logistic force elements before deploying to the TAJI military complex on 6 May this year, and is currently training an Iraqi Security Force Brigade.

Building on lessons learned from Operation Warden and reinforced by operational analysis from the Adaptive Warfare Branch, the Task Group Headquarters underwent a comprehensive program of command post and field training mission rehearsals. Again, the utility of frequent engagement between the New Zealand Joint Force Headquarters and our DJFHQ was proven in the seamless manner in which the Task Group Headquarters integrated as part of the command post rehearsal. However, the greatest adaptation introduced during these rehearsals was the application of cultural compatibility training. This training was developed in cooperation with DSTO cultural compatibility analysts. This training was directed at key headquarters staff and advisors in order to improve their interaction with foreign soldiers deliver more effective capacity training and mitigate against the threat of green on blue attacks. It was designed to make them more culturally intelligent. Specific mission events, such as meetings with senior Iraqi commanders, range practices with Iraqi soldiers and green on blue incidents were realistically rehearsed in order to confirm levels of cultural compatibility.

As the current commander of Task Group TAJI, Colonel Matt Galton reflected from his command post in Iraq: “The rigours of our mission rehearsal exercise are now paying dividends because our headquarters is well attuned to the complexities of this Build Partner Capacity Mission.” In conclusion, the deployment of Headquarters Task Group TAJI on Operation Okra epitomises the evolution of the DJFHQ since 1999. It is now a headquarters with a culture characterised by a joint approach, committed to building counterpart staff relations through international engagement and fiercely attentive to the detail of mission rehearsals. The headquarters is a product of learning and stands ready to prepare and command assigned forces, to meet Chief of Army and Chief of Joint Operations specified and contingency requirements.

1 Blaxland. J. The Australian Army from Whitlam to Howard, Cambridge University Press, 2014
2 Blaxland
3 Blaxland
4 Department of Defence Annual Report 2005
5 www.defence.gov.au Operations, Operation Philippines Assist
Welcome to the August edition of “The Brisbane Line” which includes reports on the excellent recent lunch time and evening lectures. Featuring two of the most senior military officers based in Queensland, the lecture program has maintained a high quality of both content and presentation.

In June, MAJGEN Smith DSC AO delivered the Blamey Oration for 2015, entitled, “Lessons Learned by the Deployable Joint Force Headquarters”. Appropriately, this was a genuine highlight of the year's program. In coming months, the lunch time lectures will feature presentations on, Rawanda, the future of Combat Casualty Care, a tour of duty in Afghanistan and Recruit Training for the RAN.

The monthly meeting on 16 September will be followed immediately by the AGM. This is the time when the past year is reviewed and the future considered. Please try to attend the AGM and to contribute to these discussions. Significantly, the issue of governance will be considered in the light of the interaction between RUSI National and Defence during 2015. It is hoped that there will be a report of the present governance review, being undertaken at national level, to discuss. The National AGM/Conference will be held in Hobart over the weekend after the RUSIQ AGM. It is important that RUSIQ is able to express a clear position on this governance issue at the National AGM.

Defence has not yet set out its requirements for RUSIQ to qualify for the Grant – in – Aid for the financial year 2014-15, which recently concluded. While uncertainty prevails in these matters, it is important that RUSIQ maintains a clear vision of its future direction and operational options. Your committee continues to work on these challenges, so that RUSIQ can continue to deliver the best and most appropriate service to all members. I welcome dialogue on these issues at any time, including at the AGM on 16 September.

The July evening lecture provided a most interesting presentation by Captain Richard Arundel. This series will continue on Wednesday 2 September. I encourage you to support this initiative, especially as its future will depend on the response to the two remaining evening lectures for 2015, in September and November.

It has been decided that the next RUSIQ Seminar will be held in the first half of 2016, to allow adequate time to plan, fund and implement the program. RUSIQ still needs more volunteers, so if you are in a position to assist in any way, please discuss this with the Hon Secretary or myself. I encourage all members to attend the lectures series as often as possible and to stay for the AGM on 16 September.

John Lewis Forrest

MAJGEN Stuart Smith was educated at Saint Paul’s College in Adelaide and gained scholarship entry to RMC Duntroon in 1981. He graduated to the Royal Australian Infantry Corps in 1984, and completed a variety of appointments with the light and mechanized battalions of The Royal Australian Regiment. He attended the British Army Command and Staff College in 1996 before serving as a staff officer with 3 Brigade in Townsville, Army Headquarters in Canberra and 1st Division/Deployable Joint Force Headquarters in Brisbane. In 2002 he served as the Chief of Army Liaison Officer to the Australian Government Senate Committee Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade.

Major General Smith has wide command and operational experience. He served with the United Nations as a Military Observer in Lebanon and Syria in 1993 and as Commanding Officer of the 1st Battalion the Royal Australian Regiment in East Timor in 2003. He conducted Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief Operations as the Chief of Staff of Australian Joint Task Force 629 following the earthquake/tsunami in Indonesia in 2004, and as Commander 3 Brigade following Cyclone Yasi in North Queensland in 2011. He was the Deputy Commander of Australian Joint Task Force 633 (Afghanistan) in 2008 and returned as the Commander (Middle East) in 2012. He assumed command of Headquarters 1st Division/Deployable Joint Force Headquarters on 31 October 2012.

He is a graduate of the Australian Institute of Company Directors and Australian Defence College. Major General Smith has the tertiary qualifications Bachelor of Arts (1984), Master of Business Administration (2000) and Diploma Defence and Strategic Studies (2006). He was appointed as a Member of the Order of Australia in 2005 for exceptional service to the Australian Army. In 2013 he was awarded with a Distinguished Service Cross for his work as Commander Joint Task Force 633 on Operation Slipper.
The Brisbane Line

Secretary’s Notes

The RUSIQ office hours are currently Tuesday and Wednesday of each week from 0930 to 1500. From the 5th October, these office hours will change to Monday and Tuesday of each week from 0930 to 1500. The building and the Library will be open and staffed by our committee members or volunteer staff during these times. Messages may be left anytime on the phone numbers or the email address. Ian may be contacted anytime by his mobile phone 0418 878 205 or by email to willoughby@qld.chariot.net.au.

Changes to RUSIQ Lecture Venue: The revised operation and access procedures under Safebase Charlie security status, results in all visitors to Victoria Barracks having to be booked in, issued with a temporary visitors pass, and escorted within the Barracks by a member with a permanent pass. In addition the lower car park area of Victoria Barracks has been closed off resulting in only limited car parking being available for visitors. Under this situation, it is not practical to continue to hold the RUSIQ lectures within the RUSI Hall.

Until further notice the lectures will be held in the United Service Club, Brisbane. This situation should only continue for that period that the security and parking restrictions in Victoria Barracks are in place. RUSIQ would wish to return its lectures to the RUSI Hall as soon as the situation allows.

While the August and September Lectures and the AGM will be held on the 3rd Wednesday, the October and November lectures are to be re-scheduled to the 3rd Tuesday of the month which we hope will result in an improved service at the United Service Club resulting from a lower utilization of the club for other functions.

Two RUSIQ functions are being planned for the following months. An organised tour of the Brisbane Maritime Museum at South Bank which includes a Barbeque Lunch is planned for Friday 9th October at a cost of $25 per person including entrance to the Museum. Please advise the Secretary if you wish to attend the event with payment to the Secretary by the 30th September. At least 30 attendees are required for the event to proceed.

The RUSIQ President’s Christmas Luncheon is to be held on Friday 20th November in the United Service Club. The cost for a 2 course Christmas menu will be $55 per person. Full details are to follow so mark this date in your diaries.

All members are requested to advise us of their Email address if they actively use one. This will help us to advise them of our activities throughout the year and save on the amount of postage and telephone calls. The Brisbane Line will only be sent by email of those members who have nominated to receive it by this method.

Ian Willoughby

Library Donations

The President and Committee thank the following for their generous donations during the year 1/7/2014 to 30/6/2015 and apologize for the deferred acknowledgements:

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RUSI LECTURE
The Development of Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) Capability for the Defence of Australia
By WGCDR Matthew Bowers

The need for RPA’s was defined in 2009. After six years into Afghanistan, there was no dedicated Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft. The Orion aircraft (AP-3C) was trialled but was considered too noisy and had insufficient time on task capability. All ISR assets were pooled in Regional Command South and the ISR bidding system removed flexibility for any dynamic tasking. This disabled the ability to ‘soak’ an area prior to an operation. This did not satisfy the ‘Statement of Requirement’ which was to produce REAPER like capability with kinetic effects.

The Israeli Heron RPAS was already operational with Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) in Kandahar Airfield (KAF) Afghanistan and afforded a 60% solution, but Australian Operational Command (OPCOM) and other key stakeholders had an organic ISREW platform. The ADF was able to rapidly acquire RPAS through a contractor and in 2009 the first crews were deployed to KAF to set-up. In January 2010 No. 5 Flight (5FLT) was established for developing Heron RPAS. The number of operational hours in 2010 was approximately 55 hours per week and by January 2012 had increased to more than 127 hours per week. A retrograde fit-out was undertaken in December of 2013 and became a coalition asset.

In theatre roles the importance of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and electronic warfare (EW) is vital to build up a ‘pattern of life profile’, to protect troops on the ground by scanning roads and proposed routes. This is achieved by real-time video and EW analysis. It also provides vital support with find, fix and post-strike collateral damage scans.

Heron RPA’s are able to conduct surveillance in assigned areas which can be relayed to troops on the ground, via satellite communications through Ground Control Stations (GCS), Ground Data Terminals (GDT), Ground Mission Stations (GMS) and command centres.

The Heron is equipped with a number of sophisticated photographic and EW sensors which greatly enhance the operator’s battlespace reconnaissance capabilities. RPA’s come equipped with: Full motion video (FMV); Laser pointer; EW sensors; and Remote Video Terminal Output (ROVER).

Since 2010 completed operational time for UAS in Afghanistan has exceeded 27,000 hours. Currently there are 5 categories of Department of Defence (DoD) UAS which fulfil the following functions.

The find, fix, finish and post-mission assessment capability has improved significantly. It becomes a lethal weapon as engagement with armed and unarmed UAS is enhanced. With over 10 hours operational time, units can be used to monitor ‘pattern of life’ surveillance and any changes of operation based on intelligence received, can cover either a wide area or a narrow area. This provides greater flexibility and adaptability as UAS units can perform multiple missions per sortie by utilizing a variety of payloads with an increased range in conjunction with manned or unmanned teams. It enables improved networking to TPED ISR delivery chain.
Development of RPA Capability c’td from P. 7

Persistence is essential as it is not possible to ever have enough intelligence prior to an operation. Assets should be flexible enough to support multiple ‘customers’ on a mission and be capable of being re-tasked rapidly. UAV’s can provide communications and video support to troops on the ground via satellite and mobile and landline telephonic communications, enabling large amounts of data to be transmitted quickly to a variety of locations. Data transfer is very close to real time and can be exploited.

By the time the UAS arrives back at base, ‘post mission data’ is already available. The footprint of UAS’s and their support crew is much smaller than that of an AP-C3. RPA’s have 35 Defence personnel and 12 Contractors and averages 6,600 hours per annum operational time, whereas the AP-C3 has 155 personnel and averaged 2,000 hours operational time. UAS’s can be deployed rapidly into any new theatre e.g. three UAS can be loaded onto one 747 and operational within 48 hours of arrival at the new theatre. If customers purchased operational hours this could be used to offset the costs associated with purchase of UAS’s. Training could be moved to Australia where No. 5 Flight could influence the direction of future selection, development and training of aircrew and contractors.

Current ADF capabilities consist of the Heron-1, RQ-7B Shadow and the Scan Eagle. The mission and purpose of each differs as does their range and endurance for each designated mission. Current planning for RPA’s extends out to 2025. Essential criteria for future RPA’s is speed, endurance and persistent surveillance. Payloads need to be flexible for improved strike capability on designated targets. RPA units need to be able to tolerate a greater range of weather conditions.

Personnel is one of the challenges facing RPAS, combined with the expense and limited bandwidth of satellites and the certification and integrations of engineering standards for RPAS and their operation over populated areas and in civilian airspace. Operators of RPA’s will require training and qualifications.

**BATTLE OF TEMPLETON’S CROSSING**

*Source: Australian War Memorial Website*

Templeton’s Crossing was the first point where the Kokoda Trail, crossed Eora Creek. It was named after Captain Sam Templeton of the 39th Battalion, who was killed on 26 July 1942. The Japanese conducted a determined defence of Templeton’s Crossing area as they withdrew.

The 2/23rd Battalion first made contact with positions forward of Templeton’s Crossing on 12th October 1942. For the next 2½ days the battalion sought to attack and outflank Japanese positions, but made no progress. The 2/25th Battalion, advanced on Templeton’s Crossing along a subsidiary track, but were unable to advance.

On the morning of 15 October the 3rd Battalion moved in a wide arc around the right flank of the 2/23rd with the aim of attacking the Japanese from their flank, but their positions had been abandoned. The 2/25th broke through the enemy force holding them. Three Australian battalions converged on Templeton’s Crossing, but the Japanese had withdrawn.

Seeking to consolidate their hold on Templeton’s Crossing, the Australian battalion commanders decided the 3rd would press on several hundred metres up the track. They encountered another Japanese rear-guard position. Attacks on 17th October captured some of the position, but Australians were harried by counter-attacks throughout the night and the next day. Further offensive action was hampered by two companies of the 3rd Battalion becoming lost in the jungle, and a breakdown in communication between the 3rd and the 2/25th. Due to a stalemate the 16th Brigade began to relieve the battle weary 25th.

The trail above Templeton’s Crossing was cleared by an attack mounted by the 2/2nd Battalion on 20th October. The 2/2nd concentrated on the right flank of the Australian positions (Japanese left flank), whilst two companies attacked at right angles to the trail, and another two a roughly 45 degrees. Fighting along the Kokoda Trail, consisted of small groups of Australians tackling Japanese machine-guns with small arms and grenades.

By nightfall, the four Companies’ occupied two positions astride the trail, with the Japanese sandwiched between them. It was planned to renew the attack on the 21 October with the assistance of the 2/1st Battalion, but during the night the Japanese had escaped through the jungle and fallen back on Eora Creek.
RUSI LECTURE 1st July 2015
HMAS SYDNEY – SMS EMDEN Action of November 1914
By Captain Richard Arundel RAN (Rtd)

The Commonwealth Naval Force (CNF) commenced with Federation in 1904 and became the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) in 1911 by royal warrant. The RAN’s first Admiral Sir William Rooke Creswell, trained with the Royal Navy (RN) and campaigned for an Australian Fleet Unit to replace the RN Cruiser Squadron based in Sydney, (achieved in 1913). The RAN was the first Commonwealth navy to evolve, but was considered an adjunct of the RN. The British Admiralty controlled the RAN in WW1. Fleet Commander, Rear Admiral Patey RN was appointed and promoted to Vice Admiral (VADM) in September 1914 ensuring he had seniority over Creswell, our Chief of Naval Service (CNS), throughout WW1.

By the mid-19th century steel hulls, steam propulsion, developments in weapons and electronics led to modern tactics that necessitated better signalling than flags and lights in foggy conditions. Marconi (German Telefunken) invented a primitive M/F wireless which was introduced to major navies prior to WW1. At the outbreak of WW1, large ships and submarines were linked by wireless and land cables to Command Control Headquarters worldwide. Australia linked to Colonial Office and the Admiralty by Overland Telegraph. Germany installed a Light Cruiser Squadron in China, Tsingtao (Qingdao) and was building 5 radio stations linking mandated territories in the west Pacific by cable and wireless to Berlin. Rabaul became the administrative capital for the German Pacific mandated islands. It was a modern military base and posed a threat to the eastern seaboard of Australia.

On 4th August 1914 the RAN and Australia’s military capability were offered to Britain. Australia sent a Naval and Military Expeditionary Force (AN&MEF) to capture German Pacific radio stations, territories south of the equator, and to intercept Admiral Von Spee’s East Asian Squadron and destroy it. The AN&MEF successfully undertook the first task, but failed to locate Von Spee; aware that he was being hunted by AUSTRALIA, from radio interceptions of GPO shore wireless transmitters using un-coded RAN callsigns. Von Spee fled to South American waters where he destroyed two RN cruisers with a total loss of life on 1 Nov 1914 at Coronel before being cornered and destroyed at Falkland Islands on 8 Dec 1914. Von Spee’s ships used wireless extensively and linked with colliers in neutral Dutch East Indies ports, whereas, the Admiralty controlling Admiral Patey’s ships, failed to recognize the MELBOURNE.

The RAN’s fleet signal officer had an installed “inverted L aerial’ which could have accurately co-ordinated bearings and distance measurements to fix Von Spee’s squadron in German New Guinea waters and incurred our first casualties with the loss of submarine AE1 off Rabaul. After Von Spee moved out of Australian and New Zealand waters his light cruisers EMDEN and KONIGSBERG, operating out of German East Africa commenced a cruiser war on British trade routes. A scheme to safely convoy a force of Australian and New Zealand soldiery to train in the UK before the ‘war in Europe’

A DIFFERENT OUTCOME?
It raises serious conjecture as to the outcome on 9th or 10th November 1914 had EMDEN’s first salvos exploded on impact; she had discovered the convoy by wireless interception; by capturing the OSTERLEY; spotting IBUKI’s huge tell-tale smoke canopy over the convoy as EMDEN circled the Cocos Islands and then stood off to the west so as to work up astern of the unprotected convoy’s rear and, during the night, opened fire upon the 10 unprotected New Zealand ships, perhaps first overwhelming SYDNEY by torpedoes, thus leaving only two cruisers to defend 38 ship convoy whose sailing orders were unclear as to how to act, if it were attacked by an enemy vessel that had slipped into the 180 square mile convoy box in a very lonely ocean.

Von Muller acknowledged he missed this enormous opportunity. The political impact of partial success upon future naval operations on Australian and New Zealand Stations would have been substantial. The Admiralty would probably have lost operational control of the RAN fleet unit. The Admiralty had known several days prior to action that KONIGSBERG had been blocked up the Refugi River south of Zanzibar but failed to inform the OIC convoy escorts, however the Japanese Admiralty had informed IBUKI prior to the action! Had Glossop known KONIGSBERG’s location on 9th Nov he would not have left EMDEN without medical support for an entire day after the action. Von Muller’s strong criticism of him for this would later affect Glossop all his life.

Captain Richard Arundel RAN (Rtd)

Sydney – Emden Action c’td on P. 10
Sydney – Emden Action c’td from P. 9

gathered speed. Because of wet, wintry conditions on British training bases the force was halted in Egypt and from there proceeded to the Gallipoli peninsula. Japan declared war against Germany on 23 August 1914, units from IJN served with RN, RAN, RNZN and French naval forces in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

This first convoy transported 30,000 troops, 7,900 horses and equipment comprising 38 merchant vessels (28 chartered by Australian Government and 10 by New Zealand). In November 1914, the 12 inch heavy cruiser AUSTRALIA moved to the eastern Pacific to hunt down Von Spee’s cruiser squadron, off Chile. Two RAN light cruisers MELBOURNE and SYDNEY were escorts, Japanese cruiser IBUKI and the RN cruiser HMS MINOTAUR which commanded the convoy. By 1st November the convoy sailed from Albany. Two days later two large liners laden with troops, escorted by IBUKI joined the convoy from Fremantle. IBUKI took station as the starboard convoy escort of 4 cruisers. Elaborate precautions were taken to protect the convoy from the press and German sympathizers.

The route was chosen by Admiralty; however IBUKI burnt huge amounts of coal and would need to re-coal before Cape Town. The convoy’s route was changed and skirted east of the Cocos Islands on route to Colombo. Von Spee’s light cruiser EMDEN and sister-ship KONIGSBERG had not been located, (EMDEN had captured or destroyed 32 vessels in 2 months), and operating on trade routes between India and Penang. Two more RN cruisers joined the convoy north of Cocos. A day from Cocos, Admiralty detached MINOTAUR to Cape Town to thwart German intrusions from the Atlantic. The convoy stopped briefly; MELBOURNE moved to MINOTAUR’s lead position to command the convoy (38 merchant vessels), leaving the convoy’s rear unprotected. Concurrently, EMDEN was paralysing trade routes in the Indian Ocean. Creswell sent his 2nd Naval Member CAPT Gordon-Smith RN to be the convoy’s principal Transport Officer.

CMRD Von Muller in EMDEN believed any Australian convoy would sail via South Africa or directly to Aden west of the Cocos. He decided to disrupt part of Australia’s strategic communications by raiding the cable and wireless station on Direction Island. He descended on the Cocos Islands with his captured British collier BURESQ. His Telefunken wireless equipped cruiser had not intercepted any of the first convoy’s wireless traffic, because he concentrated on commercial shipping between India and Singapore.

The Orient mail steamer OSTERLEY bound for England overtook the convoy and sailed north-west being narrowly missed by EMDEN approaching the Cocos. Had OSTERLEY been captured with its mail cargo and passengers, the convoy would have been compromised. IBUKI’s uncontrollable smoke canopy could be seen 40 miles away posing another hazard. Von Muller arrived too late on 8th November to land, so EMDEN circled the island overnight just inside the gap leading to the convoy, without sighting any warship guarding a valuable strategic communications asset. The convoy was 50 miles away to the south-east. On 9th November at 6.24am the duty staff on Cocos picked up a coded group from a Telefunken transmitter. The code was questioned without response. The MINOTAUR, not MELBOURNE was signalled, but MINOTAUR was 200 miles away and did not respond. Signalling was primitive with only 1 range restricted ship to shore area circuit available. The cable and wireless station Duty Officer sighted an unknown 4 funnelled warship making for Cocos. Eventually the rear funnel could be seen flapping; Von Spee’s light cruisers had 3 funnels. The first coded message from EMDEN was to collier BURESQ arranging a rendezvous to coal.

The OIC initiated the first enemy report in WW1 on the Australian Station, “SOS STRANGE WARSHIP APPROACHING.” As his wireless began to be jammed he added, “Possibly EMDEN”. MELBOURNE picked up the SOS message and moved to intercept this unknown warship but realized her prime duty was to protect the convoy; SYDNEY was ordered to make for the Cocos Islands. IBUKI wanted to join SYDNEY and broke out her battle ensign but was ordered back to SYDNEY’s old screen station. At 9.30am SYDNEY signalled that she had sighted an enemy ship and steamed north. Captain Silver RN in MELBOURNE ordered IBUKI to join him between the convoy and where the unknown vessel might cross the convoy’s path. At 10.45am SYDNEY signalled, “Am briskly engaging enemy”. At 11.10am, SYDNEY signalled, “EMDEN breached and done for”. The news spread rapidly through the convoy. EMDEN’s sister-ship KONIGSBERG was suspected to be cooperating nearby. SYDNEY was obliged to stand by the cable and wireless station, whilst the convoy with only 2 escorts, until a third RN cruiser was still to join, continued north.

When the SYDNEY – EMDEN action began the German had the advantage, his 10, 4.1 inch calibre weapons could fire at
Sydney – Emden Action c’td from P. 10

a 30° angle out to maximum range of 9,500 yards whilst SYDNEY’s 8 heavier 6 inch calibre guns could only attain 18° max elevation. EMDEN fired rapid salvos every 6 seconds. Fifteen of her direct hits failed to detonate, SYDNEY suffered her only casualties in the first 10 minutes. One unexploded shell killed a man in the bridge area. Had it exploded it could have killed Captain Glossop RN and his gunnery officer nearby. SYDNEY got EMDEN’s range; smashed her wireless room, steering gear, range-finders, then the forward funnel and foremast when the primary fire-control station went over the side. SYDNEY fired a torpedo but the range setting was too short. The German’s crew suffered heavily and all but 2 gun crews were killed. Key reserves were desperately needed but were ashore with the landing party that had disabled the radio and cable installations. Close to North Keeling Island, Von Muller ran his ship ashore to save as many crew as possible.

SYDNEY chased down the collier whose crew opened the Kingston valves to avoid capture. With the collier sunk Glossop learned of the landing party from the collier’s crew and returned late in the evening to the wrecked EMDEN; who was still flying her battle flag and when challenged appeared not to surrender. Although hard aground, Glossop fired two salvos into her before the flag came down and a white sheet appeared over her quarterdeck. That delay resulted in the death of 20 wounded men, laid out on the forecastle. SYDNEY waited off Direction Island overnight; the landing party under LCDR Von Mucke confiscated the islands schooner AYESHA and escaped with his 50 man raiding party towards neutral Padang. With German trader SS CHOISING he transhipped to the South Arabian coast, to the Mecca railway and back to Germany. An audacious and brilliant escape.

SYDNEY returned to the wreck of the German cruiser at 1.00 pm the next day, a full day after the initial engagement to begin the recovery and urgent medical treatment of the wounded. The scenes were appalling. An estimated 134 of the EMDEN’s 361 crew died; either killed in the action, drowned or succumbed to their wounds. The combined efforts of the SYDNEY’s 2 doctors, the Island’s doctor and EMDEN’s remaining doctor worked non-stop for two days to save many men. EMDEN’s second doctor was blown over the side, swam ashore but died raving mad from drinking salt water.

Von Muller claimed there were four main reasons he lost the gun duel with the RAN cruiser viz. SYDNEY’s shells were three times heavier, more effective at long range, shell splinters severely damaged his ammunition hoists and SYDNEY’s gun shields were more effective. Eight of EMDEN’s ten gun crews were killed, and SYDNEY was heavier and her gun fire much steadier in any sea. Von Muller acknowledged that he made an error sending EMDEN’s gunnery personnel in the landing party who were replaced by unskilled crew when they went to action stations. Only five of the fifteen hits on SYDNEY exploded in the first minutes of action. EMDEN could have taken control of the fight. Critical salvos did not detonate because shell handlers did not reset war head safety catches to direct action when loading guns. Both gunnery officers were disabled early in the action!

On November 13th, British armed merchant cruiser the EMPRESS OF RUSSIA took EMDEN’s non-wounded survivors from SYDNEY to Colombo. SYDNEY arrived in Colombo on 15th November with a large number of wounded Germans on her upper deck and requested that no cheering should herald her arrival from crowded troop ships. Later Von Muller criticized Glossop for re-opening fire on his ship when hard aground despite not having lowered his ensign as an immediate sign of surrender and not having replied to visual signs. Ironically, at the Battle of Coronel off Chile on 1st November, (day the convoy sailed from Albany), capsized British cruiser HMS MONMOUTH, (her ensign still flying), could not be reached, was sunk in the same manner by Von Spee’s ships. There were no survivors.

SYDNEY had 4 men killed and 12 wounded during the initial encounter. Sixty were Australian youths, (20 were under 16½); three of these were wounded. The SYDNEY/EMDEN relationship was honoured last year; a German Iron Cross was presented, to be attached to SYDNEY’s mainmast in Sydney Harbour opposite Garden Island. Two memorials have been erected at Cocos Islands commemorating the action and association of the SYDNEY/EMDEN historical committee.

References:
1. Vol 1 Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18
2. Vol 9 Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18 - The RAN
3. Vol 10 Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18 – The Australians at Rabaul
5. CMDR F Creswell, RAN communications in WWI, HMAS CERBERUS Signals Communication School, c. 1970
6. CAPT B Kent RN, Signal: A History of Signalling in the RN
WHAT IS THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTE

The RUSI in Australia followed on from the traditions of the Royal United Service Institution and Defence Studies formed in London in 1831. The inaugural President in 1892 was Major-General J.I. Owen, Commander Qld Defence Force. It was for many years known as the Naval and Military Institute. Just before World War 2, it was named the United Service Institute. Initially it was formed for the education of military officers of the three Services. On 6 January, 1989 the Institute was incorporated and on 12 September, 1996 it changed its name from United Service Institute Queensland Incorporated to the Royal United Service Institute Queensland Incorporated.

The aim of the Institute is to encourage discussion of National Security and Defence matters and to improve public awareness and understanding of such issues. The Institute maintains an excellent library of more than 9,000 books covering current Service Equipment, Doctrine and Strategy, Defence and Security, and Military History and convenes lectures throughout the year on these and related subjects. The Queensland Institute produces its own newsletter 'The Brisbane Line'.

The Institute is located in Victoria Barracks, Brisbane (Building D3) in premises which include a large lecture theatre, a library with reading rooms and a mess ante-room. Hours are 9.30am – 3pm Tuesday and Wednesday excluding Public Holidays.

Membership is available to adult persons in sympathy with the aims of the Institute. The membership year runs from 1st July to 30th June. Membership application forms are available from the Secretary.

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VALE: LT COLIN HORBURY RICHARDSON
It is with deep regret that we advise the passing of Lt. Colin Richardson on 4th May 2015 at the age of 94. His Army service was a remarkable story of fortitude and survival on the Kokoda Track in New Guinea in 1942.

Colin was seriously wounded at Templeton’s Crossing in the Owen Stanley Range by a Japanese sniper. He was shot through the left shoulder and out his lower back destroying a lung. It was seven hours an Army medic and a Catholic priest saw him.

He had stopped breathing and the priest read him the “Last Rites”. When Colin heard someone say, “This boy is dead,” it scared the life back into him. They say that only two people have come back to life... Jesus Christ and Colin Richardson.

The Army medico was Dr. Geoff Mutton who only had some catgut and a few safety pins left in his haversack to stitch up Colin’s wounds front and back. Fuzzy Wuzzy Angels carried him for three days to the nearest aid station and was then flown out to a field hospital. He spent more than a year in hospitals in Australia.

In the 1990’s Colin had a very large safety pin made out of brass and mounted on a polished mahogany board with a suitable inscription. The doctor, who saved his life, was tracked to Wagga Wagga in N.S.W. Colin travelled there and presented Dr. Mutton with the memento of his life saving efforts. They remained the closest of friends.

Farwell Colin. We will always remember you for the fine officer and thorough gentleman you were.

Rest in peace; old mate.

Keith Victorsen OAM

Article on Battle of Templeton’s Crossing on P. 8